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Article
The Pre-NSC Origins of National Security Expertise
GREGORY S. MCNEAL
America's contemporary security state-a massive bureaucracy staffed
with military and civilian experts-is a dominant feature in current debates
over national security policy. Few decisions regarding war and diplomacy
are made without consulting executive branch experts. While many
contend that the current national security bureaucracy is an outgrowth of
the National Security Act of 1947 (NSC), the origins of national security
expertise as a concept date back to the founding. The Founders
recognized that "energy in the executive" was a key element of good
government and early drafts of the Constitution even referred to a cabinet-
style government which would include a Department of Foreign Affairs
and a Department of War. After the founding the nation debated the
propriety of secret presidential advisers, sole Presidential conduct of
foreign affairs, the dividing line between matters of peace and matters of
war, and the propriety of executive branch agencies created, staffed, and
exercising powers at the discretion of the president and subject only to his
authority and expertise. The nation's experiences during the Civil War,
during the beginning of the industrial age, and during World War I each
incrementally changed the nation's understanding of founding era ideas
regarding national security expertise. This Article traces those historical
developments, ties them to founding era debates and contemporary affairs,
and argues that scholarly discourse about authority is oftentimes
inextricably tied to debates over national security expertise.
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The Pre-NSC Origins of National Security Expertise
GREGORY S. MCNEAL*
I. INTRODUCTION
America's contemporary security state-a massive bureaucracy staffed
with military and civilian experts-is a dominant feature in current debates
over national security policy. Few decisions regarding war and diplomacy
are made without consulting executive branch experts. While a prominent
feature of American society today, the current executive branch security
apparatus witnessed its greatest growth following World War II. But, the
concept of national security expertise has origins which date back to the
founding. This article is part of a commentary issue focused on Aziz
Rana's article, Who Decides on Security?' Rana's contribution to the
national security literature enhances our understanding regarding questions
of authority in national security decision-making. He argues that despite
over six decades of reform initiatives, the overwhelming drift of security
arrangements in the United States has been toward greater-not less-
executive centralization and discretion. Building off of points made by
Rana, this article makes a unique contribution to the literature by drawing
attention to the fact that struggles over national security authority are
oftentimes intimately tied to notions of expertise. Accordingly, this article
explores some of the historical origins of the concept of national security
2
expertise.For much of American history, periods of peace and periods of major
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. Special thanks to the
commentary editor at the Connecticut Law Review for organizing this issue and providing an
opportunity to respond to Aziz Rana's article, Who Decides on Security?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1417
(2012). Thanks to librarian Gina McCoy who provided outstanding assistance in finding obscure
sources to support some of the arguments made in the Article.
1 Who Decides on Security?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1417 (2012)
2 This Article is not intended as an exhaustive exploration of the historical origins of national
security expertise. Rather this Article explores the origins of the concept as they relate to Rana's
arguments about authority and to a lesser extent, secrecy. Interestingly, the literature on national
security expertise is not very deep. When the term is used in law journals, it is most frequently used to
refer to the debatable assumption that courts lack institutional competence in matters of national
security. Nonetheless, notable contributions to the literature include ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY AND THE COURTS (2007), Robert M.
Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009), Stephen Holmes, In Case of
Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 97 CAL. L. REV. 301 (2009), and
Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, The State, and The Separation of Powers, 90 TEX. L. REV. 797
(2012).
war were defined and distinct.3 In periods of peace, the State Department
managed matters of foreign affairs, and, during major wars, the Navy and
the War Department were preeminent until the national emergency ended.4
However, "[b]y the late 1930s many policymakers and scholars had begun
to criticize this bifurcated approach to U.S. foreign policy."5  These
policymakers argued that advancements in technology and the rise of
totalitarian regimes made the old policy-making approach dangerous and
anachronistic.6 The modem solution to these problems originated in the
post-World War II National Security Act of 1947.7
The National Security Act established the expert bureaucracies of the
National Security Council,8 the Office of Secretary of Defense,9 the U.S.
Air Force,' 0 the Joint Chiefs of Staff," and the Central Intelligence Agency
("CIA").12  Following the passage of the act, the President, for the first
time, had a statutorily authorized staff member and support staff "whose
purpose was to give the president advice and assistance in matters
pertaining to national security."' 3  This centralization of military and
intelligence services was no doubt influenced by the nation's experiences
in World War II. As former Yale Law Dean and current Department of
3 Cf MARY L. DuODZiAK, WAR TIME 4 (2012) ("This book takes up the idea of wartime and its
effects, showing that a set of ideas about time are embedded in the way we think about war. In
particular, we tend to assume that wartime is always followed by peacetime, and there that an essential
aspect of wartime is that it is temporary. The assumption of temporariness becomes an argument for
exceptional policies, such as torture. And those who cross the line during war sometimes argue that
circumstances deprive them of agency; their acts are driven or determined by time.").
4 CODY M. BROWN, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENT'S
MOST POWERFUL ADVISERS i (2008), available at http://www.pnsr.org/data/images/
the%20national%20security%2Ocouncil.pdf.
5Id.
6 See id.
7 National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. §§ 401-442b (2006)). For a history of the National Security Act, see DOUGLAS T. STUART,
CREATING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE: A HISTORY OF THE LAW THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA
(2008), Brown, supra note 4 at 81 ("Since passage of the original National Security Act of 1947,
Congress has left unchanged the fundamental purpose, function, and duties of the NSC. Each President
has made an independent determination of the type of NSC that would best serve the nation. But over
time, it is clear that the NSC has evolved from a limited advisory council to a vast network of
interagency groups that are deeply involved in integrating national security policy development,
oversight of implementation, and crisis management. This evolution has not been the result of
congressional action, but rather presidential determination, rooted in the increasingly complex task of
managing and optimizing U.S. national security.").
8 National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495, § 101 (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. §§ 401-442b (2006)).
9 Id. § 202 (repealed 1972).
'0Id. § 208 (repealed in part 1956 & 1966).
11Id. § 211 (repealed 1956).
12 Id. § 102 (codified as amended 50 U.S.C. § 403).
13 SAM C. SARKESIAN ET AL., U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY: POLICYMAKERS, PROCESSES & POLITICS
78 (4th ed. 2008).
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State Legal Adviser Harold Koh noted, "[t]he central innovation of the
1947 National Security Act was its recognition that the management of this
complex structure of agencies and alliances required a unified national
security system, centered in the executive branch.' 4 That unified national
security system focused on formalizing the structures for national security
expertize, and centralizing those functions within the executive branch
under the firm control of the President.
While the National Security Act centralized foreign affairs and
national security decision-making, this centralization marked the
culmination of ideas that had existed since the founding and had evolved
throughout the nation's history. 15 The Founders recognized that "energy in
the executive" was a key element of good government and early drafts of
the Constitution even referred to a cabinet-style government which would
include a Department of Foreign Affairs and a Department of War.16 After
the founding the nation debated the propriety of secret presidential
advisers, sole Presidential conduct of foreign affairs, the dividing line
between matters of peace and matters of war, and the propriety of
executive branch agencies created, staffed, and exercising powers at the
discretion of the president and subject only to his authority and expertise.
These historical facts and the debates surrounding them are oftentimes
associated with arguments about Executive power, however a corollary,
and perhaps overlooked aspect of the power argument is the role of
expertise.
This Article takes the position that the centralization of certain national
security decisions in the hands of experts who report to the President
relates to broader debates about Presidential power, but is a distinct
concern. Stated differently, one can accept either that Congress (rightly or
wrongly) will oftentimes defer to the President's functional expertise, or
one can adopt the view that because of his greater functional expertise the
President possesses inherent authority to act in matters of national security.
Regardless of which theory one subscribes to, the idea of expertise can no
doubt be tied to the efficiency that flows from a unitary actor whose
responsibilities include daily supervision of experts within the national
security bureaucracy. Extending deference to Executive branch decisions
may be premised upon a belief in Executive branch expertise, or it may
simply be deference borne of convenience, for the purposes of this Article,
it is sufficient to recognize that perceptions of expertise are frequently tied
to arguments over authority.
14 HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 102 (1990).
15 For a general discussion of these ideas, see generally MICHAEL J. HOGAN, A CROSS OF IRON:
HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE, 1945-1954 (1998).
16 Koh, supra note 14, at 76.
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Arguments over authority are a feature of national security scholarship
because the Framers intended there to be debates and conflict between the
branches.' 7 The framers vested an undefined "executive Power" in the
President and made him "Commander in Chief" of the Army and Navy.
However, they also gave to the Congress the power to make rules for the
regulation of the Army and Navy, and gave them control over spending.
The Founders made the President responsible for and subordinate to the
law by stating that he "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." The institution of divided authority makes for a President who
must honor the Constitution's separation of powers, who must abide by
valid laws passed by the Congress, and must conform his reliance on his
own authority and expertise with the dictates of Congress. Such an
arrangement was intentionally designed to ensure that there would be
struggles over any attempts to concentrate the powers of government in
one set of hands.'8
This Article shows that part of the historical trend toward placing
unilateral authority in the hands of the President was an outgrowth of the
President's ability to react quickly and coherently to foreign initiatives 9
something I refer to as his functional expertise or functional advantage. It
also was grounded in a belief that certain matters required a cadre of
trained experts capable of analyzing and dealing with complex threats.
The current bureaucratized national security system is the culmination of
that recognition of functional expertise and the quest for a cadre of trained
experts.
This Article's goal is modest: it seeks to trace some of the historical
17 For a small sampling of this vast literature, see ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS (1976); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb- Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding,
121 HARv. L. REV. 689 (2008); Harold H. Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign
Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988); Harold J. Krent, Separating the
Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253 (1988); Charles A. Lofgren, War
Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672 (1972); David J.
Luban, On the Commander-in-Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477 (2008); Michael D. Ramsey,
Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV 1543 (2002); and John C. Yoo, The Continuation of
Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV 167 (1996).
18 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 232 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating "The
conclusion I am warranted in drawing from these observations is, that a mere demarcation on
parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments is not a sufficient guard against those
encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same
hands."). Rather, Madison believed that the interior structure of government must be organized so that
competition and mutual relations would check each part of government, keeping the other in its proper
place.
19 KOH, supra note 14, at 77-78 ("The varied task of nation building-recognition of and by
foreign states, establishment of diplomatic relations, and conclusion of treaties-all demanded a branch
of government that could react quickly and coherently in foreign initiatives. Not only was the office of
the president ideally structured for such responsive action, it was filled during those early years by
founding presidents of unusual personal force.").
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examples of expertise in matters of national security that pre-date the 1947
National Security Act.20 It begins in Part II by discussing early American
history at the time of the founding, and shortly thereafter. This part briefly
outlines the influence that political theory had on the drafters of the
Constitution, noting that political theory and the British experience with
war provided essential context for the Founders. That context, the
structure of the vesting clause, and the desire for unity, speed, and dispatch
suggest that the framers believed that the president would possess certain
functional advantages which would lend him greater expertise in matters of
national security. The founding era debates over secrecy, also discussed in
this part, lend credence to the argument that debates over authority were
oftentimes bound up in discussions of whether elected officials or the
people could be trusted to make expert decisions regarding matters of war.
Part III picks up where Part II ends, discussing nineteenth century
examples of presidential expertise, and deference to such presidential
expertise. This part concedes that there are nineteenth century sources
suggesting that the legislative and judicial branches were skeptical of
executive discretion, however the goal of this part is to highlight some of
the contrary sources from this era. Specifically, this section looks briefly
at the Civil War era examples of a government which during a time of
crisis placed few limits upon the President's discretion and expertise in
matters of warfare.
Part IV, focuses on the scholarship of Woodrow Wilson, a proponent
of administrative reform. It outlines how Wilson believed that diffusion of
authority and expertise prevented effective government. It explains how
his reform ideas were to create a system of empowered experts who would
sit in the void created by fights over power and authority, operating in a
fluid space of administrative action, bounded by law but empowered by
delegation from political actors. This discussion sets the stage for Part V
which discusses the explosion of WWI era expert agencies, created at the
sole discretion of a President empowered by broad enabling acts passed by
Congress. This Part highlights how an evolution in thinking about
expertise set the stage for the modern national security state and its
complement of expert actors. The Article concludes by making the non-
controversial observation that these historical examples are an outgrowth
of the Founders' plan to leave matters of security undefined and subject to
the needs of the nation to respond to "national exigencies."
21
20 For a discussion of the events leading up to the passage of the National Security Act, see
generally Aziz Rana, supra note 1.
21 See THE FEDERALIST No. 23, supra note 18, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The authorities
essential to the common defense [should be limitless] because it is impossible to foresee or to define
the extent and variety of national exigencies ....").
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II. EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY AND NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERTISE
The constitutional scholar Clarence Berdahl, quoting James Garner,
once wrote, "'the domain of the executive power in time of war constitutes
a sort of 'dark continent' in our jurisprudence, the boundaries of which are
undetermined.' ' 22  While the boundaries of executive power remain a
source of constant scholarly discussion,23 the idea of executive or
presidential expertise has received far less attention. This lack of attention
is surprising given the fact that The Federalist No. 23 recognized that
"[t]he principal purposes to be answered by union are these-the common
defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace, as well
against internal convulsions as external attacks .... ,24 The Founders
intended to create a system of government that would value the type of
expertise that could handle threats to the nation. While that expertise
might be found in either the legislative or executive branch, the vesting of
22 CLARENCE A. BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (1921)
(quoting James W. Garner, Le Pouvoir Ex~cutif en Temps de Guerre Aux Etats-Unis, 35 REVUE DU
DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE 13 (1918)).
23 See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2011) (discussing the evolution of presidential power); JOHN YOO, CRISIS
AND COMMAND: THE HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE BUSH
(2009) (chronicling individual presidents and their use of executive power); David J. Barron & Martin
S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 941,947-48 (2008) ("[ln sharp contrast with Congress's substantial acquiescence to the assertion
of some executive power to employ military force unilaterally, the legislature has not acceded,
pragmatically, to the Executive's preferred resolution of the separation of powers disputes concerning
control of the actual conduct of campaigns."); Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power
Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2003) (challenging the "Vesting Clause
Thesis" on historical and textual grounds); Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing
Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 338-41 (2006) (arguing that the
President has the constitutional authority to issue signing statements and rejecting arguments that such
statements are an abuse of the executive's power); Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's
Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2282, 2287-93 (2006) ("[The President has the authority to]
prescribe incidental details needed to carry into execution a legislative scheme, even in the absence of
any constitutional authorization to complete that scheme."); William M. Goldsmith, A New Look at an
Old Argument, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 65 (1988) (discussing ongoing debate concerning the division
of power between the President and Congress with regard to conduct of foreign affairs); Harold Hongju
Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2364, 2367, 2368-73 (2006) (arguing that that
Constitution imposes limits on the President's power to act unilaterally in national security and foreign
affairs and criticizing the completion power argued for by Goldsmith and Manning); H. Jefferson
Powell, The Founders and the President's Authority over Foreign Affairs, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1471 (1998) (examining founding-era documents and concluding "the President possesses significant
independent constitutional authority over foreign affairs"); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D.
Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, Ill YALE L.J. 231 (2001) (arguing inter alia the
President enjoys a residual foreign affairs power under Article II, section 1, which is limited by specific
allocations of foreign powers to other entities); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1640 (2002) ("[T]he Constitution creates a flexible system of war powers [that]
provides the President with significant initiative as commander-in-chief, while reserving to Congress
ample authority to check executive power thorough its power of the purse.").
24 THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 153.
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undefined executive powers in the hands of the President, suggests that the
Founders were willing to accept a dynamic role for the President in matters
of national security. 5 The principal purpose of common defense, surely
requires some level of expertise as the Founders no doubt "understood that
they could not foresee the myriad potential threats to national security that
might later arise[;] they chose to create a Federal Government that
necessarily possesses sufficient power to handle any threat to the security
of the Nation.,
26
The Founders, well versed in the political theories of their time, were
highly influenced by Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone. As Aziz Rana
notes, "[t]he philosophical positions of Hobbes and Locke not only shaped
the development of modem political thought, but also provided the
intellectual context for early American debates about the meaning and
implications of security.",27 Similarly, in his classic work The Control of
American Foreign Relations,28 Quincy Wright noted that the work of
Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone were "the political Bibles of the
constitutional fathers. 29 Indeed, many of the Framers were "well read in
history and political philosophy-from ancient Greece and Rome to
contemporary Continental Europe. As erstwhile Englishmen, however, the
Framers turned to English ideas and experiences above all others."
30
What did the Founders, influenced by these political theorists say
about national security expertise? Not much directly, but quite a bit by
implication. To reason by implication, the analysis must begin with a
determination of who has authority or power to decide on matters of
national security. In that regard, Wright wrote:
[W]hen the constitutional convention gave "executive
power" to the President, the foreign relations power was
the essential element in the grant, but they carefully
protected this power from abuse by provisions for
senatorial or congressional veto. This power ought to be
distinguished from the power of the President as head of
25 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1, cl. 1.
26 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
27 Rana, supra note 1, at 1417, 1435.
28 QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 363 (1922).
29 Id. By way of illustration, Montesquieu and Blackstone are mentioned in The Federalist. See,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, supra note 18, at 73-76 (Alexander Hamilton) (mentioning
Montesquieu); THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra, at 275-77 (James Madison) (same); THE FEDERALIST
No. 47, supra, at 301-05 (James Madison) (same); THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra, at 512 (Alexander
Hamilton) (mentioning Blackstone).
30 STEvEN DYCUS ET. AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 10, 13 (2012). (noting also, that "[g]eneral
theories of government were not the only European notions to influence the text of the Constitution.
The Framers' views of war and peace, in their declared and undeclared forms, seem to be derived
especially from Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and Burlamaqui.").
20121
CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW
the administration which he exercises independently
within the limits of congressional legislation and which by
present usage forms the essential element in "executive
power.,
3 1
Similarly, Robert Turner argued that there is an important distinction
between the language in Article I, Section 1, which provides that "'all
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States"' and "the much more comprehensive grant in article II to
the president of not 'all executive Powers herein granted"' but instead 'the
executive Power . ... ,, Turner contends that "[b]ecause of this
difference in wording, it was necessary for the Founding Fathers to
enumerate every foreign affairs power of Congress, while permitting them
to convey the bulk of the executive foreign affairs powers to the President
31 WRIGHT, supra note 28, at 147. Professors Prakash and Ramsey explain that because "Locke,
Montesquieu, and Blackstone, the great political philosophers most familiar to the Framers, said that
foreign affairs powers were part of the executive power," then "in 1877, when the Constitution
provided that the President would have 'the executive Power,' that would have been understood to
mean not only that the President would have the power to execute the laws (the primary and essential
meaning of 'executive power'), but also that the President would have foreign affairs powers." Prakash
& Ramsey, supra note 23, at 253 (footnotes omitted).32 ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RESTORING THE RULE OF
LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 55 (1991). The extent to which Article n, section 1 vests executive
power in the President over foreign affairs has been the subject of much debate. See, e.g., BERDAHL,
supra note 22, at 11 ("The lack of such express limitations in the article dealing with the Executive has
led to some difference of opinions as to whether the executive power vested in the President by the
Constitution is defined and limited by the following specified powers, or whether it includes other
powers not enumerated but naturally executive in character. Even if the former interpretation of the
Constitution is accepted as correct, the conception of the term 'executive power' still remains
somewhat vague, since several of the expressly enumerations powers of the President, such as his
powers as Commander-in-Chief and his power to see that the laws are executed, are in themselves
undefined in the Constitution, uncertain as to their limits, and therefore subject to various
interpretations."); KOH, supra note 14, at 76 ("Although the Framers also vested the 'executive power'
in the president, they expressly incorporated within the nebulous grant neither an exclusive power in
foreign affairs nor a general war-making power. Nor, despite expansive claims later asserted by more
recent advocates of presidential power, did the Framers intend apparently by that grant to bestow upon
the president an unenumerated inherent authority to take external actions."); Bradley & Flaherty, supra
note 23, at 551 ("[T]he difference in wording between the Article I and Article II Vesting Clauses can
be explained in other plausible ways and need not be read as distinguishing between a limited grant of
legislative powers and a plenary grant of executive power."); H. Jefferson Powell, The President's
Authority Over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 527, 535
(1998) ("I[T]he fact that the arguments for the President's authority over foreign affairs rest largely on
structural inference, while Article I expressly delegates power to Congress over foreign commerce,
does not suggest that the presidential authority is any less legitimate or is to be interpreted any less
liberally than the congressional power. The words of the Constitution are authoritative, and any
persuasive constitutional argument must make sense of the provision or provisions of the text that bear
on the issues being considered, but the interpreter is equally responsible for giving due weight and
proper respect to the political and legal institutions and relationships that the text creates.") (footnotes
omitted).
[Vol. 44:1585
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in the first sentence of article II.,, 33 While Turner's point is to suggest that
this is an exclusive vesting of the foreign affairs and national security
powers in the President, for the purposes of this Article it is sufficient to
recognize that the presidency at least shares the power to decide on matters
of national security (which are no doubt matters requiring expertise) and
that should the legislature choose to abdicate its role (by not exercising its
power or not offering its own institutional expertise) the presidency
possesses sufficient authority to act based on its own power and
competence, relying for authority grounded in the exercise of "the
Executive power.
34
Turning back to matters of political philosophy, in a manner of
reasoning similar to Turner's, William Goldsmith, in his treatise The
Growth of Presidential Power, wrote that the Founders were "greatly
influenced by Blackstone's definition of executive powers, and gave their
democratic monarch many of the same responsibilities. '35 Blackstone
believed that it was an executive prerogative to handle all aspects of
"national intercourse with foreign nations" which requires expertise and by
33 TURNER, supra note 32, at 55. But see LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 27-28 (2d ed. 1996) (offering a contrary view of shared power and shared
expertise, and noting: "the Framers were hardly ready to replace the representative inefficiency of
many with an efficient monarchy, and unhappy memories of royal prerogative, fear of tyranny, and
reluctance to repose trust in any one person, kept the Framers from giving the new President too much
[power].... Every grant to the President... relating to foreign affairs, was in effect a derogation from
Congressional power, eked out slowly, reluctantly, and not without limitations and safeguards.").
34 According to Prakash and Ramsey, even those that disagree with a reading of Article II that
vests foreign affairs powers in the President, "usually admit[] that the President is the 'sole organ of
official communication' in foreign affairs." Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 23, at 243 (citing HENKIN,
supra note 33, at 42) ("That the President is the sole organ of official communication by and to the
United States has not been questions and has not been a source of significant controversy."). The
reference comes from then-Federalist member of the House of Representatives John Marshall's closing
remarks in the Case of Jonathan Robbins (a.k.a. Thomas Nash). See Robert F. Turner, War and the
Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the Constitution: A Review Essay of John Hart Ely's War and
Responsibility, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 903, 935 (1994); see also Powell, supra note 23, at 1515-16
(describing the Robbins/Nash case in more detail). In his speech, Marshall states: "The President is the
sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. Of
consequence, the demand of a foreign nation can only be made on him. He possesses the whole
Executive power. He holds and directs the force of the nation. Of consequence, any act to be
performed by the force of the nation is to be performed through him." 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613
(1800). The value of this speech in terms of presidential power over foreign affairs is disputed by
some. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Basic Principles of the War Power, 5 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y
319 (2012) (criticizing academics and jurists for failing "to put Marshall's speech in proper context").
Nevertheless, the speech has been praised and cited at length. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 23, at
1512-14 & nn.148-56 ("The importance of understanding what Marshall actually meant by this
expression stems in part from his personal stature as a constitutionalist, but perhaps even more because
of the praise that has been accorded over time to the speech. Marshall's own contemporaries viewed it
as a masterful argument .... ").
351 WILLIAM M. GOLDSMITH, THE GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A DOCUMENTED
HISTORY 56 (1974).
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definition implicates matters of national security.3 6  Similarly,
Montesquieu, addressing what we now think of as national security, wrote
in The Spirit of Laws, that the executive has primacy "over things
dependent on the right of nations. 37 The term "right of nations" as used
here, was an historical reference to the "law of nations" and the war power
or what is now known as matters of national security.
Moreover, one can read Locke as supporting the notion of exclusive
presidential power and expertise. Locke explained that the power to
execute laws was distinguishable from the "federative power" stating:
These two powers, executive and federative, though they
be really distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending
the execution of the municipal laws of the society within
itself upon all that are parts of it; the other the management
of the security and interest of the public without, with all
those that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet they
are always almost united. And though this federative
power in the well or ill management of it be of great
moment to the commonwealth, yet it is much less capable
to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws than
the executive; and so must necessarily be left to the
prudence and wisdom of those whose hands it is in to be
managed for the public good. For the laws that concern
subjects one amongst another, being to direct their actions,
may well enough precede them. But what is to be done in
reference to foreigners, depending much upon their actions
and the variation of designs and interest, must be left in
great part to the prudence of those who have this power
committed to them, to be managed by the best of their skill
for the advantage of the commonwealth.38
Note how Locke makes reference to the "prudence and wisdom" and
managerial "skill" of those who are entrusted to act. The implication is
that while many may have varying degrees of input into matters of national
security, effective governance requires trusting that the one with authority
to act will have sufficient expertise to act. Furthermore, Locke noted the
impracticability of separating the expertise and authority to act, writing
16 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 114 (Bernard C. Gavit ed., 1892).
" CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. 11, ch. 6, at 156 (Anne M. Cohler et al.
trans & ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748). Montesquieu further explains that the executive
"makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes security, and prevents invasions." Id at
157. 38 
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 73 (J.W. Gough ed., 1948) (emphasis added).
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"for both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is
almost impracticable to place the force of the Commonwealth in distinct
and not subordinate hands. 3 9  Given the influence that Locke,
Montesquieu and others had on the Founders, we can assume that the
Founders understood that they would need to reconcile how America's
government would deal with matters of foreign relations and national
security. They created a system of government which recognized that in
those matters dealing with the security of the nation, the President might
possess functional advantages that would lend him greater expertise. But
expertise alone, was an insufficient basis on which to design good
government, because the Founders were also fearful of tyranny.
Thus, while recognizing the President's expertise, the Founders were
nonetheless fearful of aggregating too much power in the hands of one
person. Thus, their dilemma was to design a government which would
simultaneously arm the President as commander-in-chief with the authority
to act with speed and dispatch, taking advantage of the expertise at his
disposal, while simultaneously constraining his power. The Founders
therefore sought to create Constitutional mechanisms to guard against the
concentration of power in the hands of the President, ensuring that even a
wellspring of popular support for a heroic commander-in-chief expertly
leading the nation in war couldn't lead to military rule.
These fears regarding a military coup were well grounded; consider
John Adams' writings in 1787 regarding the lessons of history, in
particular the lessons from Caesar's rise to power. Adams wrote,
"Caesar... had no hopes of obtaining from [the Senate] the prolongation
of his power, and the command of a province .... In order to carry his
point, he must set aside the authority of the senate, and destroy the only
check, the only appearance of a balance, remaining in the constitution. A
tool of his ... moved the people to set aside the law.., and by their own
unlimited power name Caesar as proconsul ... with an army of several
legions. ' 4° Adams was fearful that "some general might overawe the
republic" with his expertise and military prowess, destroying checks and
balances.4' As such, he and the Founders put in place constitutional
mechanisms that in Louis Henkin's words were grants of power, eked out
slowly and not without limitations and safeguards.42
The Founders also had in mind more contemporary examples of
military coups, as they were no doubt aware of the five military coups that
39 
id.
40 3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, 272 (London, Stockdale 1794) (1787).
4' David Luban, On the Commander-ln-ChiefPower, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 511 (2008).
42 HENKIN, supra note 33, at 27-28.
20121
1598 CONNECTICUTLA WREVIEW [Vol. 44:1585
took place in England during the middle of the seventeenth century.43 The
Founders learned from these events that an army could seize the political
institutions of a nation, and they sought to simultaneously guard against
such concentrations of power, while still creating a strong executive." In
fact, the Founders dealt with their own military revolt in 1783 when a
group of angry, unpaid soldiers descended upon the Congress, only to be
placated by George Washington's overtures. Three months later
"Congress fled from Philadelphia to Princeton after unpaid Pennsylvania
soldiers surrounded the statehouse." 45  The lesson was not lost on the
Founders with even presidential power proponent Alexander Hamilton
warning in The Federalist No. 21, against the dangers posed by
"'malcontents... headed by a Caesar." 6 The Founders were clearly aware
of the risks associated with creating a government where a skilled leader
could use military expertise to his advantage and secure power for himself.
But a fear of expertise, does not mean the Framers didn't recognize the
virtues of a skilled leader, rather they merely sought mechanisms to ensure
that expertise did not allow the President to aggrandize his power.
To counter the possibility of a power-grab premised upon the
aggregation of military expertise under the command of one man, the
Founders established a system which cabined Presidential exercise of
power and expertise. While the Framers of the Constitution wanted to
ensure that the commander-in-chief could exercise military expertise with
speed and dispatch, they also recognized that not all security challenges
required speed. Thus, at the Virginia ratifying convention, George
Nicholas stated "The President is to command. But the regulation of the
army and navy is given to Congress. Our representatives will be a
powerful check here.'4 7 And with respect to the fear that a president might
seize command of the militia, Nicholas noted "God forbid we should ever
see a public man in this country who should have this power. Congress
only are to have the power of calling forth the militia.'4 8 These ratification
era remarks highlight the fact that the Founders were aware of the
problems associated with aggregating national security expertise in one
branch of government. Accordingly, they designed mechanisms within the
Constitution to address the legitimate need for unity, speed and dispatch
43 See Luban, supra note 41, at 512-13; see also SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER, HISTORY OF THE
COMMONWEALTH AND PROTECTORATE, 1649-1656 (1901).
44 Id.
45 Id. Citing JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 143 (1996); Lawrence Delbert Cress, Republican Liberty and National Security:
American Military Policy as an Ideological Problem, 1783 to 1789,38 WM. & MARY Q. 73, 88 (1981).
46 THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 18, at 135 (Alexander Hamilton).
4 The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia, on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution (June 14, 1788) in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 365, 391.48 Id. at 393.
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while recognizing that not all national security problems require expertise
that is wielded with speed-some matters may be appropriately addressed
by a deliberative body like the Congress.
49
As an example, to ensure that the experts employed by the President
are not wholly beholden to him, the Article 2 Appointments Clause
requires Senate advice and consent for appointment of federal officers (and
legislation requires Senate advice and consent for appointment of general
officers).5 ° Similarly, the Take Care Clause requires that the President
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed" which forces the President,
in the exercise of his national security expertise to follow the laws passed
by Congress.5' As David Luban notes, "[t]he Take Care Clause embeds
the presidency in a civilian, rule of law culture, not a military, efficacy-first
culture. Even though the framers did not explicitly draft the Take Care
Clause as a check on a president's military ambitions, its emphasis on the
primacy of civilian rule of law provides powerful evidence that the
Constitution was not meant to establish a warrior-president., 52  Taken
together, this history suggests that the Founders designed a system that
could cabin Presidential power while still maximizing Presidential
expertise.
It is important to note that while the Founders were fearful of power
grabs, enabled by Presidential expertise, they were not so fearful that they
believed that the Congress alone possessed sufficient expertise to
effectively manage matters of national security. This much was obvious
from their Revolutionary War experiences when Congress exercised
outsized control over the military.53 That control lasted until the Congress
49 Specifically, Congress possesses the power "To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, but
no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and
maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; To
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
invasions. ... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
50 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; 10 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2006).
51 See Luban, supra note 41, at 526 ("There is no hint in either the text or debates that this duty
ceases when presidents act in their capacity as commander in chief."). For more on this point, see the
statement of Congressman John Marshall, who while defending President John Adams' extradition of a
British subject under the Jay Treaty of 1795, stated: "The treaty, which is a law, enjoins the
performance of a particular object. The person who is to perform this object is marked out by the
Constitution, since the person is named who conducts the foreign intercourse, and is to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed The means by which it is to be performed, the force of the nation, are
in the hands of this person. ... Congress, unquestionably, may prescribe the mode, and Congress may
devolve on others the whole execution of the contract; but, till this be done, it seems the duty of the
Executive department to execute the contract by any means it possesses." 10 Annals of Cong. 613-14
(emphasis added).
52 Id. at 527.
53 Luban, supra note 41, at 528 ("When Congress appointed Washington commander in chief of
the Continental Army in June 1775, it instructed him 'punctually to observe and follow such orders and
directions, from time to time, as you shall receive from this or a future Congress ... or a committee of
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realized that they were incapable of effectively directing the military
campaign, and with the military effort on the verge of collapse the
Congress turned operational command over to Washington. 54 This model
of operational command housed in the Executive branch was the form of
government adopted at the constitutional convention.
Hamilton, making note of the challenges associated with legislative
direction of matters of national security argued that "difference of
opinion... might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the
government in the most critical emergencies of the state."55 During the
debates over the Constitution in North Carolina, James Iredell made a
similar point, stating "the command of armies ought to be delegated to one
person only. The secrecy, dispatch, and decision which are necessary in
military operations, can only be expected from one person., 56  Iredell
invoked the concept of "decision" while Hamilton invoked the idea of
"competent powers" 57 both ideas harken back to Locke's references to
prudence, wisdom and skill.58 Moreover, both are oblique references to the
idea of expertise which is inherently bound up in the concept of authority.
They are related because even if one has the authority to command, one
cannot command what one does not have the competence and expertise to
understand. In Hamilton's words, this concept of unity was "the power of
directing and employing the common strength [which] forms a usual and
essential part in the definition of executive authority."59  The Founders
understood that at least for situations requiring speed and dispatch, the
President would need to be entrusted with the power of command, and his
expertise would, for practical reasons, need to be placed in unitary and
subordinate hands.
How the Framers chose to deal with executive secrecy can also inform
us about their views on expertise in matters implicating the security of the
nation. Some of the Founders understood that secrecy was an essential
component of executive power and expertise. This is a controversial
Congress, for that purpose appointed."'). For a lengthy discussion of this history, see David J. Barron
& Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-Framing the Problem, Doctrine
and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 770-92 (2008).
54 1d. See also Dycus et al., supra note 30 ("[W]hile Congress sought to carry out its policies
through committees, boards, and appointed agents, it soon became apparent that the exigencies of the
war were beyond the legislature's capacity to manage. Broad powers had to be delegated to the Board
of War and to General George Washington. Nevertheless, Washington and other military leaders were
often forced to choose between acting on the basis of ambiguous grants of authority or referring
questions to Congress for decisions. This arrangement proved to be extremely inefficient.").
55 THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 18, at 424, (Alexander Hamilton).
56 Debates in the Convention of the State of North Carolina on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution (July 28, 1788).
57 THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 18, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton).
58 Locke, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
59 THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 18, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton).
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assertion, at least in the eyes of scholars such as Rana who suggest that
executive secrecy in the development of national security policy is contrary
to the democratic principles the nation was founded upon.60 The argument
Rana makes is that government decisions which take place in secret,
particularly those involving national security, are contrary to the Founders
vision of a nation where popular knowledge was sufficient for judging
questions of security.
To bolster his argument, Rana cites Mitchell v. Harmony61 decided in
1851. In Mitchell the Court was called upon to evaluate (among other
issues) whether the United States was at war with Mexico. Rana notes that
the Court believed that citizens could make "determinations of threat as
ultimately rooted in shared and popularly accessible judgments about
safety and survival-judgments that might reasonably be reached by a
group of ordinary Americans drawn from a representative pool of
citizens., 62 To make those determinations, Rana argues that Justice Taney
declared that government secrecy had to be set aside so that citizens (not
experts in any branch of government) could make judgments about
whether the nation was in a state of emergency sufficient to trigger reliance
on executive branch claims of national security expertise. While I don't
question Rana's account of Mitchell, and its holding with regard to
assertions of government secrecy, the case is less valuable than he makes it
out to be because it does not grapple with any contrary founding era
sources that support assertions of national security secrecy.
One founding era source supporting assertions of national security
secrecy is Thomas Jefferson's legal opinion, drafted for President
Washington on April 24, 1790, in which he stated:
The transaction of business with foreign nations is
executive altogether; it belongs, then, to the head of that
department, except as to such portions of it as are specially
submitted to the senate. Exceptions are to be construed
strictly; the constitution itself, indeed, has taken care to
circumscribe this one within very strict limits; for it gives
the nomination of the foreign agent to the president, the
appointment to him and the senate jointly, and the
commissioning to the president.
[T]he senate is not supposed by the constitution to be
acquainted with the concerns of the executive department.
It was not intended that these should be communicated to
60 Rana, supra note 1, at 1417.
61 Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 133 (1851).
62 Rana, supra note 1, at 1448-49.
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them; nor can they therefore be qualified to judge of the
necessity which calls for a mission to any particular place,
or of the particular grade, more or less marked, which
special and secret circumstances may call for. All this is
left to the president; they are only to see that no unfit
person be employed.63
In Jefferson's view, at least in this legal opinion, the Senate lacked the
authority, beyond the appointment power, to weigh in on matters
implicating foreign affairs (and by extension national security). Moreover,
because information was not to be "communicated to them" they were also
not "qualified to judge" the propriety of any mission. Thus, members of
the legislature could be kept in the dark about matters of foreign affairs and
national security, and contrary to Rana's reliance on Mitchell, the People
themselves could also be prevented from learning about certain matters
related to the security of the nation. As a matter of practice, by the end of
the Washington administration, the President's custom was merely to
notify the Senate of proposed negotiations when it consented to his
appointment of the negotiator and to submit to the Senate a copy of his
instructions to the negotiator only with the completed treaty.
64
Jefferson's legal opinion suggests that the idea of secrecy was not
contrary to democratic principles; rather, it was a necessary element of
powers implicating the security of the nation. The President was entrusted
as an expert capable of deciding what missions were necessary, where he
would send individuals, what their grade would be, and what was properly
kept secret. The Senate's only role would be to determine whether one
was fit for office, once confirmed those subordinate experts would be
subject to employment at the discretion of the President. In this respect,
Jefferson's legal opinion stands as evidence of executive supremacy in
matters of national security and clear evidence that even Jefferson-whom
advocates of legislative preeminence cite as authority-was not an
advocate of "congressional micromanagement of national security
affairs .... , 65 More important than the executive supremacy point is what
these facts tell us about expertise. If the legislature could be kept from
knowing the details of diplomatic missions, whatever expertise they may
possess (no matter how salutary) would have no opportunity to be
63 6 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: CORRESPONDENCE 1789-1792, at
50-51 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905) (emphasis added).
64 See RALSTON HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES, 1789-1817, at 105-106 (1920).
65 TURNER, supra note 32, at 56. Similarly, Prakash and Ramsey cite the opinion as "notable
confirmation" that the "President enjoyed formidable foreign affairs powers by virtue of his executive
power." Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 23, at 305-06. Professor Powell suggests that "undergirding
[Jefferson's] textual reasoning were assumptions about the manner in which American Foreign policy
would be made that he believed were implicit in the Constitution." Powell, supra note 23, at 1483.
[Vol. 44:1585
THE PRE-NSC ORIGINS OF NA TIONAL SECURITY EXPER TISE
exercised. Thus, if Jefferson's view of secrecy and exclusion of the
legislature from knowing details of diplomatic missions is accurate, there
are matters in which the expertise of the President and his subordinates
must trump that of the legislature and even the people. The fact that this
discussion over the authority and secrecy occurred so close to the founding
demonstrates the founding era origins of arguments over national security
expertise and highlights how expertise can be tied to authority.
Not surprisingly, Hamilton also made clear his position that the grant
of executive power extends to the President the exclusive authority to
engage in matters touching on foreign relations (subject to a small set of
limitations), and by virtue of this grant the President is also entrusted with
the necessary expertise to act pursuant to this authority.66 In fact, Hamilton
stated as much when he wrote "it belongs to the 'Executive Power,' to do
whatever else the laws of Nations cooperating with the Treaties of the
Country enjoin, in the intercourse of the UStates with foreign Powers. '67
Hamilton seemed to adopt a view that there was some residuum of
undefined responsibility into which the President's judgment and expertise
would be relied upon to fill in the specifics where the Constitution
provided only generalities.68
Just as Jefferson wrote three years earlier, this power may very well
mean that the legislature will be precluded from involvement in decision-
making, decisions may be made in secret, and decisions may be made
subject to the counsel of whomever the President chooses as his advisors.
Thus, we see again that expertise and authority are inextricably linked, and
in the views of these Founders, the exclusion of the legislature suggests
that, at best, the legislature's expertise was unnecessary for the rendering
of some key national security related decisions, and, at worst, they were
perceived as lacking expertise altogether. These notions are reinforced by
66 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, PACIFICUS, NO. 1 (1793), reprinted in 15 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 38-42 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1969).
67 Id.
68 For the argument that, at least in the context of war powers, leaving it to the executive to decide
is an unconstitutional delegation, see William Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the Power to
Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1972) ("[Imt seems to me clearly
the case that the exclusive responsibility of Congress to resolve the necessity and appropriateness of
war as an instrument of national policy at any given time is uniquely not delegable at all. The pursuit
of national interest by sustained extraterritorial uses of direct force was textually reserved to Congress
alone after alternative formulations were pressed on precisely the grounds that conventionally
rationalize a limited power to delegate an interstitial lawmaking authority to the executive, viz.,
superior expertise in the executive, the need for flexibility in the face of rapidly changing
circumstances, the cumbersomeness of parliamentary processes, and a residual power to check the
executive in the event of displeasure with the manner in which he might make war. To the extent that
such arguments were considered to have merit, they were accommodated by other means among the
several war-related clauses. To the extent that they were not thus accommodated, the conclusion seems
inescapable that they were rejected and correspondingly, that no further latitude of executive control
was to be permitted than that already provided for.").
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Hamilton in The Federalist No. 70, in which he wrote:
There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a
vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of
republican government. The enlightened well wishers to
this species of government must at least hope that the
supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never
admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the
condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the
executive is a leading character in the definition of good
government. It is essential to the protection of the
community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential
to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection
of property against those irregular and high handed
combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary
course of justice; to the security of liberty against the
enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction and of
anarchy....
That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed.
Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally
characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more
eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater
number; and in proportion as the number is increased,
these qualities will be diminished.69
The opening paragraphs of this passage are perhaps the most powerful
founding era evidence in support of the idea that national security expertise
is lodged, at least in part, in the hands of the executive and the executive's
advisers. The concept of "energy in the executive" and the connection of
this concept to protection "against foreign attacks" is a clear carve out of
some residuum of national security expertise, which, as a functional matter,
must rest in presidential hands.
Turning his attention to the problem of multiple decision makers in
matters of national security, Hamilton wrote:
This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting
the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and
authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject in
whole or in part to the control and co-operation of others,
in the capacity of counsellors to him ....
69 THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 18, at 198-200 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any
common enterprize or pursuit, there is always danger of
difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office in
which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority,
there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even
animosity. From either, and especially from all these
causes, the most bitter dissentions are apt to spring.
Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability,
weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operations
of those whom they divide ....
Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had
no agency in planning it, or because it may have been
planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have
been consulted and have happened to disapprove,
opposition then becomes in their estimation an
indispensable duty of self love. They seem to think
themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of
personal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has
70been resolved upon contrary to their sentiments ....
These concluding paragraphs suggest that national security disputes
might create public disagreements and opposition by those who felt they
had no agency in making plans or by those who ultimately lost the debate
over what plan to adopt. These passages implicate two ideas. First,
Hamilton's views were consistent with a modem view that places expert
advisers in a subordinate position to the President (to protect against the
destruction of unity). Second, the modem view of the national security
state places a veil of secrecy over national security deliberations. Both
views have founding era origins and reinforce the idea that secrecy adds
value to expert national security decision making. The Founders
recognized that secrecy is important for functional reasons, and allows for
decisions to be made based on expertise rather than posturing for the
eventuality that one's opinion might not be adopted (what Hamilton called
the risk of animosity).
Turning to the Commander-in-Chief Clause, Hamilton's writings
further inform us about his views regarding presidential expertise, he
wrote:
The propriety of this provision is so evident in itself, and
so consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in
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general, that little need be said to explain or enforce it.
Even those of them which have, in other respects, coupled
the chief magistrate with a council, have for the most part
concentrated the military authority in him alone. Of all the
cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most
peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the
exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war
implies the direction of the common strength; and the
power of directing and employing the common strength
forms a usual and essential part in the definition of
executive authority.7'
Again we see the exclusion of the legislature from matters in which
they might possess the necessary expertise. The demands of unity and the
need for a "single hand" to direct the "common strength" combine to create
a military authority that rests in the hands of the President and his
subordinates. This is not just a Hamiltonian view, even James Madison,
who "strongly disagreed with Hamilton's assertion in his Pacificus letters
of broad executive powers in foreign affairs[,] ' 72 recognized that Congress
must, for prudential reasons, be kept out of the business of deploying or
directing military forces. Madison's rationale had more to do with
separation of powers, than expertise or unity, as he believed that such
direction would violate the maxim that control of the purse should be
separate from control of the sword.
With that said, while the exclusion of Congress from deploying or
directing forces was a prudential decision, it also had overtones of
expertise associated with it. Madison suggested a form of functionalism
that provided specified roles for the Congress consistent with its expertise
(regulating, raising and, funding an army) while the President would act
consistent with his expertise (command, appoint). As Madison wrote,
[T]he honorable gentleman has laid much stress on the
maxim, that the purse and sword ought not to be put in the
same hands, with a view of pointing out the impropriety of
vesting this power in the general government. But it is
totally inapplicable to this question. What is the meaning
of this maxim? Does it mean that the sword and purse
ought not to be trusted in the hands of the same
government? This cannot be the meaning; for there never
was, and I can say there never will be, an efficient
government, in which both are not vested. The only
71 THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 18, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton).
72 TURNER, supra note 32, at 67.
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rational meaning is, that the sword and purse are not to be
given to the same member. Apply it to the British
government, which has been mentioned. The sword is in
the hands of the British king; the purse in the hands of the
Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can
exist. Would the honorable member say that the sword
ought to be put in the hands of the representatives of the
people, or in other hands independent of the government
altogether? If he says so, it will violate the meaning of
that maxim. This would be a novelty hitherto
unprecedented. The purse is in the hands of the
representatives of the people. They have the appropriation
of all moneys. They have the direction and regulation of
land and naval forces. They are to provide for calling
forth the militia; and the President is to have the command,
and, in conjunction with the Senate, to appoint the officers.
The means ought to be commensurate to the end. The end
is general protection. This cannot be effected without a
general power to use the strength of the Union.73
Furthermore, in the foreign affairs context Madison seemed to agree
Jefferson's legal opinion to President Washington regarding the use of
diplomats and their appropriate "grade." It seems that it was not just
Jefferson who adopted a form of legislative deference to presidential
decisions about how to staff the executive branch and how to employ its
expert agents. Regarding Madison's views, Washington wrote:
Had some conversation with Mr. Madison on the propriety
of consulting the Senate on the places to which it would be
necessary to send persons in the Diplomatic line, and
Consuls; and with respect to the grade of the first-His
opinion coincides with Mr. Jay's and Mr. Jefferson's-to
wit-that they have no Constitutional right to interfere
with either, and that it might be impolitic to draw it into a
precedent, their powers extending no farther than to an
approbation or disapprobation of the person nominated by
the President, all the rest being Executive and vested in the
President by the Constitution.74
73 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 393-
94 (Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott 1891) (1836).
74 THE DIARY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 128 (Benson J. Lossing ed., 1860).
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This passage reinforces the Founding era view that the President is
entrusted to use his expertise as he sees fit in matters relating to foreign
relations and national security, and that it is up to him to decide whom he
confides in for advice on such matters.75 When the President decides on
security, he may very well decide with the advice of whomever he chooses
and the legislature may be left out of that deliberative decision-making
process. One of the primary motivating factors for leaving such matters to
the discretion of the President was the recognition that large deliberative
bodies like the Congress were not competent when it came to matters of
national security and also were incapable of the necessary secrecy
associated with such decisions.76
For example, in 1816 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
endorsed the idea of the President as the sole expert in foreign affairs, and
that sole expertise means that he may keep matters secret from the
legislature:
The President is the constitutional representative of the
United States with regard to foreign nations. He manages
our concerns with foreign nations and must necessarily be
most competent to determine when, how, and upon what
75 See, e.g., Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 909 (D.C. Cir.
1993) ("Article II not only gives the President the ability to consult with his advisers confidentially, but
also, to organize his advisers and see advise from them as he wishes.").
76 Indeed, as Prakash and Ramsey explain in their article, under the Articles of Confederation,
Congress had extensive power over foreign affairs; however, "from the beginning statesmen criticized
Congress as an ineffectual executive. Foreign affairs require secrecy, dispatch, and consistency, three
qualities in short supply in a plural, fluctuating executive." Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 23, at 277.
John Jay, who was then the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, voiced his frustration with Congress on
several occasions. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, Jay lamented that he "often experiences
unseasonable delays and successive obstacles in obtaining the decisions and sentiments of Congress,
even on points which require dispatch." Letter from John Jay to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 18, 1786), in
3 JOHN JAY, THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 210 (Henry P. Johnston ed.,
1891). In another letter to Jefferson, Jay wrote:
I daily become more and more confirmed in the opinion, that government
should be divided into executive, legislative, and judicial departments. Congress
is unequal to the first, very fit for the second, and but ill calculated for the third;
and so much time is spent in deliberation, that the season for action often passes
by before they decide on what should be done; nor is there much more secrecy
than expedition in their measures. These inconveniences arise, not from personal
disqualifications but from the nature and construction of the government.
Letter from John Jay to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 14, 1786), in JAY, supra, at 223. To General George
Washington, Jay wrote the following about the foreign affairs duties of Congress: "The executive
business of sovereignty depending on so many wills, and those wills moved by such a variety of
contradictory motives and inducements, will in general be but feebly done." Letter from John Jay to
George Washington (Jan. 7, 1787), in JAY, supra, at 226.
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subjects negotiation may be urged with the greatest
prospect of success. For his conduct he is responsible to
the Constitution. The committee consider this
responsibility the surest pledge for the faithful discharge of
his duty. They think the interference of the Senate in the
direction of foreign negotiations calculated to diminish
that responsibility and thereby to impair the best security
for the national safety. The nature of transactions with
foreign nations, moreover, requires caution and unity of
design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy
and dispatch.1
7
Even prior to 1816, the Framers recognized that secrecy (which
necessarily implies excluding other branches from the expert decisions of
the Executive branch) was essential to foreign relations and national
security.78 Making this point, Turner wrote:
[w]hile it is true that [the Founders] believed as a general
principle that an informed public was essential to
democratic government, they were practical men who
recognized that intelligence, military, and diplomatic
matters often had to be kept secret not only from the
nation's enemies, but even from the American people and
their elected representatives in Congress.79
774 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrrUTION 88-89 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
Powell stresses the significance of this report in its historical context: "The fact that this view was
expressed in a formal document, by members of the Senate with some significant incentive to come to
different conclusions, and that the Senate as a whole was, at the very least, undisturbed by the
Committee's opinion, strengthens this Article's thesis that arguments supporting independent executive
authority over foreign policy cannot be dismissed as sheerly opportunistic." Powell, supra note 23, at
1532-33.
'a For example, prior to the Constitutional Convention, John Jay noted on several occasions that
Congress could not keep secrets, a necessary element in foreign affairs. See Letter from John Jay to
George Washington (Apr. 26, 1779), in I JAY, supra note 76, at 210 ("There is as much intrigue in this
State-house as in the Vatican, but as little secrecy as in a boarding-school."); Letter from John Jay to
Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 24, 1787), in 3 JAY, supra note 76, at 243 ("It is greatly to be regretted that
communications to Congress are not kept more private; a variety of reasons which must be obvious to
you oppose it, and while the federal sovereignty remains just as it is little secrecy is to be expected.
These circumstances must undoubtedly be a great restraint on those public and private characters from
whom you would otherwise obtain useful hints and information. I for my part have long experienced
the inconvenience of it, and in some instances very sensibly."). Turner provides further evidence of the
Founders' perception of Congress' inability to keep secrets, quoting Thomas Jefferson: "'They said ...
That if the particular sum was voted by the Representatives, it would not be a secret. The President had
no confidence in the secrecy of the Senate .... .' Turner, supra note 32, at 926 (quoting THE
COMPLETE ANAS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 72-73 (Franklin B. Sawvel ed., 1903)).
79 Turner, supra note 32, at 922.
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In fact "as early as 1775, the management of foreign affairs was
largely delegated to a five-member Committee of Secret
Correspondence ... whose sensitive proceedings were kept from most
other members of Congress. 8°  For the President to carry out his
responsibilities in the conduct of foreign affairs, secrecy in deliberations is
oftentimes a necessity. It thus follows that if only the President and his
advisers are privy to certain information, then they must have sufficient
expertise on their own to make decisions related to foreign affairs and
national security.
In The Federalist No. 64 John Jay addressed this secrecy issue with
respect to the making of treaties. He reinforced the point that there are
matters to which the President and his advisers alone must be privy. He
argued that should the President, in his prudent judgment, require the
advice and consent of the Senate, he would seek it. Jay wrote:
It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of
whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate
dispatch are sometimes requisite. These are cases where
the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the
persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions
of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those
80 TURNER, supra note 32, at 73. In an article, Turner explained that the Committee of Secret
Correspondence was created precisely because Congress could not keep secrets. See id. at 922. Turner
went on to recount the history of the Committee sending a secret messenger to France, Holland, and
England for what may have been the first United States "'covert operation." Id. at 921-22. A
memorandum written by the committee about the operation explained the operation had to remain
secret, even from Congress, for three reasons:
First, Should it get to the ears of our enemies at New York, they would
undoubtedly take measures to intercept ....
Second, as the Court of France have taken measures to negotiate this loan
of succor in the most cautious and secret manner, should we divulge it
immediately, we may not only lose the present benefit, but also render that Court
cautious of any further connection with such unguarded people ....
Third, We find by fatal experience that Congress consists of too many
members to keep secrets.
Id. at 923-34 (quoting Verbal Statement of Thomas Story to the Committee, in 2 PETER FORCE,
AMERICAN ARCHIVES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF OHE NORTH AMERICAN COLONIES, FIFTH
SERIES 818-19 (1837-53)).
[Vol. 44:1585
THE PRE-NSC ORIGINS OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERTISE
persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or
friendly motives; and there doubtless are many of both
descriptions who would rely on the secrecy of the
President, but who would not confide in that of the Senate,
and still less in that of a large popular assembly. The
convention have done well, therefore, in so disposing of
the power of making treaties, that although the President
must, in forming them, act by the advice and consent of
the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of
intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest.
[S]o often and so essentially have we heretofore suffered
from the want of secrecy and dispatch that the Constitution
would have been inexcusably defective if no attention had
been paid to those objects. Those matters which in
negotiations usually require the most secrecy and the most
dispatch are those preparatory and auxiliary measures
which are not otherwise important in a national view, than
as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the objects of the
negotiation. For these, the President will find no difficulty
to provide; and should any circumstance occur which
requires the advice and consent of the Senate, he may at
any time convene them. Thus we see that the Constitution
provides that our negotiations for treaties shall have every
advantage which can be derived from talents, information,
integrity, and deliberate investigations, on the one hand,
and from secrecy and dispatch on the other.8'
Note how Jay framed the issue. "Those matters" which "require the
most secrecy" will be handled by the President, while the advice and
consent of the Senate will be sought "should any circumstance occur"
which requires such advice. In sum, Jay views the President's interaction
with the Senate as one where the President could say "We'll seek out your
81 THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 18, at 392-93 (John Jay) (emphasis added). Arthur Bestor
opined that
[a]s an interpretation of the original intent of the document, Jay's essay is
of the highest importance. His diplomatic experience ... fitted him better than
anyone else to judge the intended effect of the new Constitution both on the
actual process of negotiation and on the character of the relationship that would
have to be maintained between executive and legislative authorities.
Arthur Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent of the Constitution
Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REv. 527, 621-22 (1973).
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advice if we need it. Otherwise trust in our expertise."
To further reinforce the idea of secrecy as a component of expertise
(by virtue of its exclusion of other forms of expert advice), one need only
look back to Thomas Jefferson who, in 1807, wrote:
With respect to papers, there is certainly a public & a
private side to our offices. To the former belong grants of
land, patents for inventions, certain commissions,
proclamations, & other papers patent in their nature. To
the other belong mere executive proceedings. All nations
have found it necessary, that for the advantageous conduct
of their affairs, some of these proceedings, at least, should
remain known to their executive functionary only. He, of
course, from the nature of the case, must be the sole judge
of which of them the public interests will permit
publication. Hence, under our Constitution, in requests of
papers, from the legislative to the executive branch, an
exception is carefully expressed, as to those which he may
deem the public welfare may require not to be disclosed;
as you will see in the enclosed resolution of the H of
Representatives, which produced the message of Jan 22,
respecting this case. The respect mutually due between
the constituted authorities, in their official intercourse, as
well as sincere dispositions to do for every one what is
just, will always insure from the executive, in exercising
the duty of discrimination confided to him, the same
candor & integrity to which the nation has in like manner
trusted in the disposal of it's judiciary authorities.
Considering you as the organ for communicating these
sentiments to the Court, I address them to you for that
purpose, & salute you with esteem & respect.
82
Note how Jefferson invokes the idea of secrecy, when he wrote that
"for the advantageous conduct" of the nation's affairs, some matters are
best left to the executive alone who will exercise "the duty of
discrimination confided to him." While this passage is about executive
secrecy, a necessary component of secrecy is having the expertise required
to act on one's own, without the input of other actors. In other words,
Jefferson believed there were certain areas in which the Executive branch
(like that in other nations) could by design be trusted to rely on its own
expertise to make decisions concerning the entirety of government.
82 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 77, at 529-30 (emphasis added).
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In a similar vein, the Founders were deeply concerned with the
complexities involved in foreign affairs and national security. They
believed, as articulated in The Federalist No. 23, that the power to protect
the nation ought to
exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee
or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or
the correspondent extent and variety of the means which
may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that
endanger the safety of nations are infinite; and for this
reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed
on the power which the care of it is committed.8 3
Of course, this passage only speaks to the necessity of a flexible
war power in the government at large, without specifying a branch. In
fact, Hamilton made these remarks in defense of the congressional
power to raise armies. 4 But the idea is one of an adaptive war power,
capable of changing in response to unforeseeable threats to the national
security. Hamilton's concerns regarding the complexity of foreign
relations and the expertise necessary to appropriately deal with "national
exigencies" suggests that deference to the President in matters relating to
national security is appropriate, at least when the legislature decides to
allow the President and his agents to take the preeminent role in matters of
national security. These founding era sources support the idea that national
security expertise and authority are interrelated concepts. If the President
may act on his own in certain areas (those areas not specifically entrusted
to other branches) the Founders must have expected that he had the
requisite expertise to do so. Thus, the Constitution contemplates certain
circumstances where Presidential expertise will be paramount (while also
recognizing that there are areas such as regulating and funding the military
where Congressional expertise is paramount). Notions of secrecy, national
security expertise, and perhaps even a preeminent role for the President in
acting on that expertise are all concepts with Founding-era roots. Those
founding era concepts evolved during the 1800s and the early 1900s,
eventually forming the modem day national security state.
III. PRECEDENTS OF THE 1800s
The concerns of the Founders regarding national exigencies were
borne out in the face of nineteenth-century challenges, particularly the
83 THE FEDERALIST No. 23, supra note 18, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton).
84 See Charles A. Lofgren, War Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81
YALE L.J. 672, 688 (1972).
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Civil War. While Rana has highlighted the nineteenth century sources
suggesting that the legislative and judicial branches were, at that time,
skeptical of executive discretion,85 there are also contemporaneous sources
which suggest the contrary.86 For example, as early as 1836, John Quincy
Adams took to the floor of the Congress and stated:
There are, then, Mr. Chairman, in the authority of
Congress and of the Executive, two classes of powers,
altogether different in their nature and often incompatible
with each other-the war power and the peace power. The
peace power is limited by regulations and restricted by
provisions, prescribed within the Constitution itself. The
war power is limited only by the laws and usages of
nations. The power is tremendous; it is strictly
constitutional, but it breaks down every barrier so
anxiously erected for the protection of liberty, of property,
and of life .... [T]he powers of war are all regulated by
the laws of nations, and are subject to no other
limitations.87
Later, the Supreme Court drew a similar conclusion, establishing a
distinction between the powers of peace and the powers of war. The Court
in Miller v. United States wrote:
[I]f the statutes were not enacted under the municipal
power of Congress to legislate for the punishment of
crimes against the sovereignty of the United States, if, on
the contrary, they are an exercise of the war powers of the
85 See Rana, supra note 1, at 1435-41 and sources cited therein; see also, e.g., Little v. Berreme, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (holding seizure unlawful where Captain followed orders from the
President that exceeded Congress' authorization).
86 Rana, supra note 1, at 1479-81; see also, e.g., The Prize Cases, 62 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1836)
(upholding constitutionality of President's decision to pursue unilaterally blockage of Confederate ports
during the Civil War). In The Prize Cases opinion, Justice Grier wrote:
Whether the President, in fulfilling his duties as Commander-in-chief in
suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance and a
civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them the
character of belligerents is a question to be decided by him, and this Court must
be govemed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the
Government to which this power was entrusted.
Id. at 670.
87 12 REG. DEB. 4038 (1836), reprinted in SPEECH OF THE HON. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON THE STATE OF THE NATION, DELIVERED MAY 25, 1836, at 5 (1836).
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government, it is clear they are not affected by the
restrictions imposed by the fifth and sixth amendments....
Of course the power to declare war involves the power to
prosecute it by all means and in any manner in which war
may be legitimately prosecuted. 8
By this account, the prevailing nineteenth-century view was that Congress
could pass laws governing those matters of purely domestic concern. In
matters of war, however, such legislation was, in the words of the Miller
dissent:
subject to different considerations and limitations from
those applicable to legislation founded upon the municipal
power of the government . . . [and] is subject to no
limitations, except such as are imposed by the law of
nations in the conduct of war .... The war powers of the
government have no express limitation in the Constitution,
and the only limitation to which their exercise is subject is
the law of nations.89
Thus, by the time the nation faced the possibility of utter destruction in the
Civil War, all three branches of government were of the view that few
limits could be placed upon the President's discretion and expertise in
matters of warfare. While Congress may pass laws governing peacetime
endeavors, in matters of warfare the President's expertise was preeminent.
Echoing these views, Charles Sumner, the Massachusetts senator and
lawyer-who was a strong defender of President Lincoln's Civil War
policies wrote:
88 Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 304-05 (1870).
89 Id. at 315 (Field, J., dissenting). Other contemporaneous cases reinforce this view. See, e.g.,
Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Union Bank, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 276, 295-96 (1874) ("[lit has been
determined that the power to establish by military authority for the administration of civil as well as
criminal justice in portions of the insurgent States occupied by the National forces, is precisely the
same as that which exists when foreign territory has been conquered and is conquered by the
conquerors."); Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 506-07 (1870) ("The measures to be taken in
carrying on war and to suppress insurrection are not defined. The decision of all such questions rests
wholly in the discretion of those to whom the substantial powers involved are confided by the
Constitution. In the latter case the power is not limited to victories in the field and the dispersion of the
insurgent forces. It carries with it inherently the power to guard against the immediate renewal of the
conflict, and to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress. This act falls within the
latter category. The power to pass it is necessarily implied from the powers to make war and suppress
insurrections."); McCormick v. Humphrey, 27 Ind. 144, 154 (1866) ("Every measure of Congress, and
every executive act performed by the President, intended and calculated to carry the war to a successful
issue, are acts done under the constitution .... ").
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Pray, Sir, where in the Constitution is any limitation of the
War Powers? Let Senators who would limit them mention
a single section, line, or phrase, which even hints at any
limitation. . . .The War Powers are derived from the
Constitution, but when once set in motion, are without any
restraint from the Constitution ... so that what is done in
pursuance of them is at the same time under the
Constitution and outside the Constitution .... It is under
the Constitution in its beginning and origin; it is outside
the Constitution in the latitude with which it is conducted;
but, whether under the Constitution or outside the
Constitution, all that is done in pursuance of the War
Powers is constitutional.9"
Under this view, the rights of peace may even be disregarded: "[I]n
bestowing upon the Government War Powers without limitation, [the
Founders] embodied in the Constitution all the Rights of War as
completely as if those rights had been severally set down and enumerated;
and among the first of these is the right to disregard the Rights of Peace. 91
There were substantial carve-outs created for the conduct of war with
sufficient "latitude" to ensure its success. The passage, "it is outside the
Constitution in the latitude with which it is conducted" is a clear reference
to the manner in which warfare would be conducted.92 That is an idea tied
by implication to the expert means by which the nation would conduct
warfare.
In fact, as the challenges facing the nation expanded during the course
of the nineteenth century, the courts further recognized that the President
was entitled to rely on advisers and others to supplement his national
security expertise. This was not a new idea, as even Jefferson's early legal
opinions supported the notion of expert subordinate actors within the
90 Charles Sumner, War Powers of Congress: Confiscation and Liberation, in 7 THE WORKS OF
CHARLES SUMNER 128, 131-32 (1874).
" Id. at 136-37.
92 Id. In fact, Sumner even believed that expert judgments could be exercised by choosing what
source of law would apply to warfare. Andrew Kent describes this as a "dual" theory of conflict, where
the United States, in Sumner's view, had the expert discretion to choose how to respond to rebels. In
his words "The 'rebels in arms' were 'criminals' because they were committing treason and also
'enemies because their combination has assumed the front and proportions of war.' The U.S.
government, it was argued, may choose 'to proceed against them in either character, according to
controlling considerations of policy.' Then here is the rub: 'If we treat them as criminals, then we are
under the restraints of the Constitution; if we treat them as enemies, then we have all the latitude
sanctioned by the rights of war;' indeed, 'the rights against enemies, founded on war ... are absolutely
without constitutional limitation.' The choice of means was discretionary; the applicable legal regime
flowed from the choice of means made by the U.S. government." Andrew Kent, The Constitution and
the Laws of War During the Civil War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1839, 1851 (2010).
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executive branch. However, it is during this period that we first begin to
see judicial recognition of subordinate expert agents within the executive
branch. Berdahl summarized this develompent by noting "[n]ot all of the
acts required of the President can possibly be performed by him personally,
and the courts have definitely recognized that he may act through the heads
of departments." 93 For example, in Wilcox v. Jackson the Supreme Court
stated: "The President speaks and acts through the heads of the several
departments in relation to subjects which appertain to their respective
duties."94  Furthermore, in the 1842 case United States v. Eliason, the
Court noted that heads of departments are "constitutional organ[s] of the
president" and thus "rules and orders publicly promulgated through [them]
must be received as the acts of the executive, and as such be binding upon
all within the sphere of his legal and constitutional authority. 9 5 Thus, by
the middle of the nineteenth century, the Court had recognized the
functional advantages of the presidency that Hamilton espoused during the
Founding debates96 and the Court extended these principles to the
presidency as a whole, not just the President in his role as commander-in-
chief.
With respect to the President, as commander-in-chief, Berdahl noted
that he "occupies an entirely independent position, having powers that are
exclusively his, subject to no restriction or control by either the legislative
or judicial departments., 97 His expertise is such that "as Commander-in-
Chief [he] may constitutionally do what any military commander may do
in accordance with the usual practise of carrying on war among civilized
nations .... ,,98 His conduct of war is limited only "his own judgment and
discretion, subject to his general responsibility under the Constitution."99
While this sort of deference to the President's expertise may seem
limitless, the Court noted in Ex Parte Milligan that the limits of these
powers must be "determined by their nature, and by the principles of our
93 BERDAHL, supra note 22, at 21.
94 Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 513 (1839) (explaining an order by the Secretary of
War directing land for military purposes not public sale).
95 United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 291, 302 (1842).
96 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
97 BERDAHL, supra note 22, at 117; see also Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 499
(1866) ("By the supplementary act, other duties are imposed on the several commanding generals, and
these duties must necessarily be performed under the supervision of the President as commander-in-
chief. The duty thus imposed on the President is in no just sense ministerial. It is purely executive and
political. An attempt on the part of the judicial department of the government to enforce the
performance of such duties by the President might be justly characterized, in the language of Chief
Justice Marshal, as 'an absurd and excessive extravagance."').
98 BERDAHL, supra note 22, at 117 (citing JOHN JUSTON FINLEY & JOHN FRANKLIN SANDERSON,
THE AMERICAN EXECUTIVE AND EXECUTIVE METHODS 267 (1908); WILLIAM WHITING, WAR POWERS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 82-83 (1871)).
99 1d.
2012] 1617
CONNECTICUTLAWREVIEW
institutions."'100 In so far as expertise in the conduct of warfare or matters
of national security is concerned, the specific details must be entrusted to
the President alone. Thus, theorists, such as the noted law of war expert
Guido Norman Lieber, noted that the direction of military movement:
belongs to command, and neither the power of Congress to
raise and support armies, nor the power to make rules for
the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces, nor the power to declare war, gives it the command
of the Army. Here the constitutional power of the
President as commander-in-chief is exclusive.''
Thus while Congress might play an expert role in regulating the military,
concerns about speed which were highlighted during the founding, would
exclude Congress from micro-managing a war. This means that decisions
about troop movements or how best to deploy troops are war-time
judgments that are not the type of matters which could properly be
entrusted to the citizenry as a whole, or even to the legislature.'0 It was
during this period that we witnessed the greatest pre-NSC expansion in the
concept of Presidential expertise in matters of national security. The
exigent circumstances of the Civil War provided the perfect circumstances
for the expansion of founding era notions of exigency, authority, and
,' Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); id. at 139 (holding military tribunal did not have
jurisdiction to try Milligan). Despite the fact that Milligan appeared to be facing an uphill battle in
light of earlier Supreme Court decisions upholding the judgments of military tribunals-for example,
the Vallandigham case--"those opinions were issued, as was the Court's decision in the Prize Cases,
when the outcome of the war was still in doubt. By the time the Court heard Milligan's appeal, the war
had been finished for nearly a year. And what a difference that year made." JUDGING EXECUTIVE
POWERS: SIXTEEN SUPREME COURT CASES THAT HAVE SHAPED THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 104
(Richard J. Ellis ed., 2009). Professor Kent suggests the Court's true view of executive power during
wartime is closer to that expressed by Charles Sumner. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91; see
also Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1846
(2009); id at 1927 ("[T]he Court's sweeping rhetoric about the universality of constitutional rights in
Milligan cannot be taken at face value.") (footnote omitted). Professors Issacharoff and Pildes criticize
the Milligan majority opinion's rights-based approach. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes,
Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to
Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1, 9-19 (2004). For a more detailed account of
Milligan, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Story of Ex Parte Milligan: Military Trials, Enemy Combatants,
and Congressional Authorization, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 93-132 (Christopher H. Schroeder
& Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
101 GUIDO NORMAN LIEBER, REMARKS ON THE ARMY REGULATIONS AND EXECUTIVE
REGULATIONS IN GENERAL 18 (1898).
102 BERDAHL, supra note 22, at 121 ("[ln time of war the authority of the President is recognized
as being absolute as to where the war is to be conducted, whether to await the onslaughts of the enemy
and wage a purely defensive war within the boundaries of the United States, or to send the armed forces
of the United States out of the country to carry on an offensive war in the enemy territory, in the
territory of an ally, or perhaps even in the territory of a neutral.").
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expertise outlined in prior sections of this Article. In areas where the
Constitution did not speak with specificity, the Executive seized the
opportunity to carve out areas of exclusive authority and expertise. Borne
of exigency, one would expect that the claims of expertise made by the
Executive would be relinquished when the crisis subsided. However once
the emergency of the Civil War passed, the nation faced a new exigency in
the form of industrialization, the subject of the next section.
IV. INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
As the nation grappled with the challenges of industrialization at the
end of the nineteenth century, scholars and elected officials grew
concerned with the ability of government to cope with new threats to
industry and the nation. Woodrow Wilson was one of the most influential
scholars of the era and would eventually become the 28" President of the
United States. As a scholar, he believed that the government of the
founding, which was created for a "homogeneous and rural" nation needed
to be modified to serve a country now "heterogeneous and crowded into
cities."' 0 3  Wilson believed that "administrative reform would assure
efficiency, whereas the existing diffusion of authority prevented effective
action."' 4 In his book, The State, Wilson wrote that government was
designed "to accomplish the objects of organized society" and if necessary,
"there must be constant adjustment of governmental assistance to the needs
of a changing social and industrial organization."' 0 5 Wilson placed a great
degree of trust in the qualifications of experts, and he believed that
political leaders should shape the broad policies of government, and
empower administrators to execute such plans.' °6 This trust in bureaucrats
and their expertise formed the framework for an expansion of
administration in matters of domestic policy and national security.
This framework of empowered experts relied on bureaucrats who
would be "cultured and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor,
and yet so intimately connected with the popular thought, by means of
elections and constant public counsel, as to find arbitrariness of class spirit
out of the question."' 0 7 Central to Wilson's beliefs was the notion that
there was a fluid space for administrative action, bounded by law but
103 Kendrick A. Clements, Woodrow Wilson and Administrative Reform, 28 PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
Q. 320, 320 (1998) (internal citations omitted)
'4 Id. at 323.
105 WOODROW WILSON, THE STATE: ELEMENTS OF HISTORICAL AND PRACTICAL POLITICS 659,
691 (1897); see also Clements, supra note 103, at 320.
106 Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197,218 (1887).
'
07 1d at 217.
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empowered by delegation from political actors.10 8 The idea was similar to
that discussed above, with the Constitution outlining a government of
separate power and authority. The allocation of expertise within that
outline was to be decided through a struggle over authority between the
Executive and Legislative branches. Wilson's contribution to this debate
was to view struggles over authority as the biggest barrier to harnessing the
nation's expertise, and his solution was to insert a massive well trained
administrative apparatus into the middle of the separation of powers
dispute.
With regard to the scope of authority in the hands of these experts,
Wilson wrote, "the sphere of administrative authority is as wide as the
sphere in which it may move [without] infringing the laws, statutory or
customary, either in the letter or in their reasonable inferential meaning.' ' 09
Scholars such as Rana cite Chief Justice Taney as authority for the
argument that determinations of threats and other matters of national
security expertise are "ultimately rooted in shared and popularly accessible
judgments about safety and survival-judgments that might reasonably be
reached by a group of ordinary Americans drawn from a representative
pool of citizens. ' ' O Wilson, on the other hand, endorsed a markedly
different view, writing that it was the job of the political leader to listen to
and interpret the will of the people "by being spokesman for the real
sentiment and purpose of the country, by giving direction to opinion, by
giving the country at once the information and the statements of policy
which will enable it to form its judgments alike of parties and men." 1 '
Clements, interpreting Wilson's writings, states
Americans, Wilson argued, often confused the source of
authority with authority itself The will of the people was
indeed the source of authority, but the people did not and
could not rule directly. We are consulted about laws, but
we do not originate them; neither do we carry them into
execution.... There must be rule, under whatever polity,
and there must be rulers: command and obedience,
authority and submission to authority, even though the
108 BERDAHL, supra note 22, at 19 (Berdahl echoes this view especially when it comes to
discretion and delegation in the area of war powers, writing, "most authorities hold that the war powers
of the President constitute a latent power of discretionary action capable of almost unlimited expansion
in times of emergency and making the President practically absolute within a certain sphere of action")
(internal quotations omitted). For a somewhat extravagant claim as to the absolute nature of the
President's war powers, see remarks of Senator Lewis, 65 CONG. REc. 4552, 4553 (1917).
109 Clements, supra note 103, at 322.
o Rana, supra note 1, at 1437.
WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 68 (Columbia
Univ. Press 1921) (1908).
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people undoubtedly retained the right to choose their
governors in periodic elections. I believe in the people, he
said: in their honesty and sincerity and sagacity; but I do
not believe in them as my governors. "
2
Expert bureaucrats would be, in Wilson's view, "another process of
representation" accountable to elected officials by regulation, those elected
officials were themselves, accountable to the public through elections. The
concept was one of "administrative legislation" whereby regulations would
be prepared by subordinate officials (experts) in the several departments.
They would be issued in the name of the head of the department, or in the
name of the President, but it's unlikely either had much say in the content
of the regulations. The concepts of authority and expertise, while still tied
together as a matter of power, were beginning to separate as a matter of
reality and execution. The concept evolved to the point where, subordinate
officials would write and implement regulations, pursuant to the authority
of the head of a department, even in matters where the text of the statutes
vested the power to act solely in the President. 13 The evolution was such
that the expert judgments of the President and the expert judgments of his
subordinates were one and the same, just as the founding era sources
discussed above suggested.
During the early 1900s, Wilson's views as a scholar evolved due to his
experience in office. He witnessed the expansion of Presidential power
following the Spanish-American War' "4 and observed the expansion of
authority granted to the President to cope with the looming threat of a great
war in Europe. The model of expertise Wilson helped develop-expert
bureaucrats within the executive branch-became a model for America's
emerging national security bureaucracy. The next Part discusses those
expanding powers and Wilson's reaction to them.
V. THE PATH TO WORLD WAR I
The government of the United States was largely unprepared to handle
wartime mobilization leading up to World War I. 15 The lead up to the war
was characterized by "spiraling wages and prices, strikes and shortages and
a near collapse of the railroad system" leading an outraged public to blame
112 Clements, supra note 103, at 323 (internal quotations omitted).
113 John A. Fairlie, Administrative Legislation, 18 MICH. L. REV. 181, 188 (1920).
4 For a helpful elaboration on the expansion of presidential power following the Spanish
American War, see James T. Patterson, The Rise of Presidential Power before World War I1, 40 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 39 (1976).
15 Clements, supra note 103, at 330; see generally SAMUEL J. BREEN, UNCLE SAM AT HOME:
CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION, WARTIME FEDERALISM, AND THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (1984);
DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (1980); RONALD
SCHAFFER, AMERICA IN THE GREAT WAR: THE RISE OF THE WAR WELFARE STATE (1991).
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the administration for a disaster in mobilization." ' 1 6 The war required the
creation of new administrative agencies steeped with experts in
mobilization, prices, war time supplies and other military-industrial skill
sets. It is worthy of note that "Congress, in providing for these [expert
agencies], in almost every instance gave the President blanket authority to
work out the administrative details-to create the necessary offices, to
prescribe the character of their organization, and to determine upon the
administrative methods to be used."''H In short, the run-up to World War I
showed a Congress willing to forgo a constitutional struggle and defer to
the expertise of bureaucrats and the leadership of the President.
For example, in a clear act of deference to Presidential expertise, the
Espionage Act provided for the control of exports from the United States,
but did not create an administrative agency to exercise such control, rather
it merely specified that such activities be carried out "under such
regulations and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as
the President shall prescribe.""' 8  Congress thus chose not to fight the
President over the power and authority to control exports, or over the
details under which that control of exports would be conducted. It was a
complete abdication of responsibility for how the nation would engage in
the expertise based task of controlling the flow of goods out of the United
States. Likewise, The Lever Food and Fuel Control Act 19 was a dramatic
expansion of administrative authority which empowered the president to
"regulate the production, distribution, and price of food, as well as to
control the price and production of all other products, including fuel, used
in raising food.' 120  The Food and Fuel Control Act, set up no
administrative machinery, instead it authorized the President "to make such
regulations and to issue such orders as are essential effectively to carry out
the provisions of this Act," and further, "to create and use any agency or
agencies" for the same purpose. 12 1 This abdication of authority on the part
of the legislature, in favor of Executive power and expertise was
unprecedented, and allowed the President to control some of the nation's
most essential commodities. The agencies created by Wilson under this
authority included the Food Administration led by Herbert Hoover, and a
Fuel Administration led by Harry Garfield--each agency was staffed with
experts, and each was created through a broad delegation of authority. 22
These administrative agencies, modeled on the delegated expertise model
116 Clements, supra note 103, at 330.
117 BERDAHL, supra note 22, at 170.
' Act of June 15, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217.
"9 Act of Aug. 10, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-41, 40 Stat. 276.
120 Clements, supra note 103, at 331.
121 BERDAHL, supra note 22, at 170-71 (citing Act of Aug. 10, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-41, 40 Stat.
276).
, 22 id.
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of the late 1800s and early 1900s had their Constitutional roots in the
concepts of unity, speed, and dispatch discussed earlier. The nation faced
unanticipated threats, just as were predicted in The Federalist No. 23.123
And just as Locke suggested, certain matters would need to be subjected to
the "prudence and wisdom" and managerial "skill" of those who are
entrusted to act because "it is almost impracticable to place the force of the
Commonwealth in distinct and not subordinate hands. ' 24
Similarly, The Trading with the Enemy Act provided for the regulation
and control of imports and exports and allowed for the censorship of
foreign communications and foreign-language publications. The broadest
grant in the act was the empowerment of the President "to exercise any
power or authority conferred by this Act through such officer or officers as
he shall direct."1 25 To raise troops, Congress passed the Selective Service
Act of 1917126 which entrusted Presidential expertise in carrying out the
administrative details of registering military aged males. The President
was empowered to designate the time and place for registrations, and
President Wilson did so by thirteen presidential proclamations and a series
of detailed regulations. 27 The establishment of selective service boards
and their duties were generally outlined in the Selective Service Act, but
"the President was authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations under
which the boards should operate, to make rules and regulations governing
their organization and procedure, and to make 'all other rules and
regulations necessary to carry out the terms and provisions of this
section. ' '' 128 The President was further "empowered to affirm, modify or
reverse any decisions" made by the boards, thus making it clear "that while
the administrative machinery of conscription was provided for and barely
outlined by statute, its creation, supervision, method of operation, and
control were in the hands of the President.' 219 In fact, the President even
created several war agencies without any statutory authority, relying
instead on his powers as chief executive and commander-in-chief1 30  The
acts detailed above were unprecedented expansions of executive and
administrative expertise in matters of national security, each with founding
123 THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra note 18, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating "because it is
impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent
extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them; The circumstances that
endanger the safety of nations are infinite; and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be
imposed on the power which the care of it is committed").
124 Locke, supra note 38.
125 BERDAHL, supra note 22, at 170 (internal quotations omitted)
126 Act of May 18, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-12, 40 Stat. 76.
127 BERDAHL, supra note 22, at 168 n.6 (listing all thirteen proclimations).
128 Id. at 169 (internal quotations omitted).
129 Id. at 170.
13 Id. at 172 (listing, specifically, the Committee on Public Information and the War Industries
Board as examples).
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era roots in debates over authority and expertise.
In fact, of all the expert agencies created during World War I, most
were not expressly created by statute, rather Congress passed broad
enabling acts, empowering the President to take certain actions (raising
troops, controlling imports and exports, etc.) and left it to the expertise of
the President and his subordinates to construct appropriate agencies, define
their responsibilities, and enforce their regulations.' 3 '
The expansion of presidential powers during this period of time caused
administrative expertise proponent Wilson to pause and consider how the
expansion of administrative expertise (even within the Executive's control)
could be reconciled with democratic control of government.1 32 Because he
could not reconcile the two, he ultimately sought to dismantle many of the
reforms he implemented during World War I, seeking the sunset of powers
once the emergencies of war subsided. 33 While many expanded powers
did expire, the idea of expanding national security expertise sat waiting to
be reinvigorated, which, as Rana notes, Pendleton Herring was able to do
in the lead up to World War 1I.134
VI. CONCLUSION
What do these historical examples tell us about Rana's question of who
should decide on matters of national security? Whose expertise should we
trust? The examples and history outlined above demonstrate that the
Founders were in fact uncertain about the answers to these questions.
Returning to The Federalist No. 23, we can recall that:
[I]t is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety
of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and
variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy
them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of
nations are infinite; and for this reason no constitutional
shackles can wisely be imposed on the power which the
care of it is committed.
135
This passage has been subjected to extensive scholarly commentary, with
advocates using it to support and defend a variety of viewpoints with
131 Id. at 172 (noting "very few were expressly created by statute, Congress thus apparently
recognizing [sic] the importance of entrusting the details of war administration to the President").
132 Clements, supra note 103, at 333
133 Id. at 332.
134 Rana, supra note 1, at 1458-68.
135 THE FEDERALIST No. 23 supra note 18, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton).
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regard to legislative or executive primacy in matters of national security. 136
Such ambiguity and disagreement is telling, as it suggests that perhaps the
Founders intended conflict and invited a struggle over authority and
expertise in matters of national security. 13 7  If that is the case, then who
should decide on matters of security is itself a question purposefully left
for conflict. In the early years of the nation, the conflict was resolved
through a legislature and people exercising a greater role in decisions about
security; as threats to the nation increased, the requirements of unity,
speed, dispatch, and secrecy resulted in less involvement of the people in
national security matters and greater reliance on expert bureaucrats.
Perhaps if such threats subside, we may see a retreat to the prior position of
legislative and popular control over matters of national security, similar to
the sunset of powers following World War I. Nothing in the Constitution
forecloses this possibility, in fact it seems all the Constitution requires is a
constant struggle over who should decide.
136 See Cara-Ann M. Hamaguchi, Between War and Peace: Exploring the Constitutionality of
Subjecting Private Civilian Contractors to the Uniform Code of Military Justice During "Contingency
Operations," 86 N.C. L. REv. 1047, 1064 (2008) (discussing the quote in support of government
authority over private civilian contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan military operations); J. Andrew Kent,
A Textual Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 502 (arguing that the
passage supports the view that power over foreign affairs must be discretionary, and that the
Constitution "should not provide rigid, enforceable legal limits to the powers that the federal
government might need to defend against external aggression"); John Yoo, The Terrorist Surveillance
Program and the Constitution, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 565, 594-95 (2007) (arguing that unrestricted
executive power is necessary because of "[w]ar's unpredictability[, which] makes unique demands for
decisive and often secret action").
131 See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984, at 201 (Randall
W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) ("[The Constitution] is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of
directing American foreign policy."); see also Americo R. Cinquegrana, Dancing in the Dark:
Accepting the Invitation to Struggle in the Context of "Covert Action, " the Iran-Contra Affair and the
Intelligence Oversight Process, 11 HouS. J. INT'L L. 177 (1988).
2012]

